After almost three months of war, Hamas is still operating in Gaza, but its goal of uniting Palestinian movements against Israel is dead. Likewise, none of Israeli’s goals has been achieved: Hamas still has governmental and military capabilities, still holds half of the hostages, its military leadership is still functioning, and a large portion of its tunnel networks is still operational.
This is not to disparage the courage of the Israeli soldiers; they are fighting heroically to claim Gaza.
But as long as Hamas is there, no third-party solution is going to be effective.
It is an occupational stalemate.
Israel has however already lost much of its pre-attack position. The effort to normalize relations with Arabic states is out the window; none of them will defy the crowds in their streets to back a link with Israel. Israeli citizens in the north and along the Gaza border have evacuated their territories. And Israel is being forced to condemn its citizen-soldiers to months of fighting instead of peacefully productive work.
But Netanyahu is in no hurry to end the war, which is the only thing keeping him in power. Evidently his goal these days is to keep the Gaza war on a simmer, and expand the shooting war into Lebanon and the West Bank. His allies in the Biden administration have an unsavory (to Netanyahu) goal of establishing a Palestinian state that includes Gaza and the West Bank.
Israeli columnists like Yossi Verter say that all the major political figures — except for Netanyahu’s militants — agree on the basic solution: “demilitarization by Israel, removing everything from Kalashnikovs to tunnels, security control along the lines established with the Palestinian Authority over Area B in the West Bank, working with moderate Arab powers to rehabilitate the enclave, and civil administration by Palestinian officials who have not been involved in terror or incitement.”
Media on the ground in Gaza say that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has given a false impression of its success, with its claims of the thousands of Hamas dead. The number of Hamas fighters killed by the IDF is much smaller. The story being told about victory over Hamas is being pushed by the same people who said that Hamas would not fight.
On the other hand, the number killed by indiscriminate Israeli bombing is much higher: more than 25,000 civilians. The bombing, by comparison, is worse than that inflicted in WW2. Mark Timberlake notes that “So far, 29,000 air-to-surface munitions have been dropped on Gaza. Israel has dropped the equivalent munitions of two nuclear bombs on Gaza, deliberately targeting civilian ‘power targets’ including schools, hospitals and apartment buildings. In just over two months, Israel’s carpet bombing of Gaza has proportionally caused more destruction than the allied bombing of Germany during WW11: the bombing campaign over Germany destroyed 10% of all buildings; 33% of all buildings in Gaza have been destroyed, including over 50% of all buildings in the northern half of Gaza, where entire residential neighbourhoods have been obliterated.”
There are horrific stories of Israeli combat abuse, but they are lacking authentication at the moment — as are the Israeli claims against Hamas. It is easy to become enraged; harder to find the truth.
I would guess that most Israelis are against the current violence, as are most Palestinians.
Despite the IDF claims, according to columnist Yitzhak Brik, destroying Hamas’ tunnels will take many years, and it will cost Israel many casualties: “Even the army now admits that there are hundreds of kilometers of tunnels, located deep underground, with multiple branches. Some even have multiple stories, with many good spots to stage a fight. Hamas built them over the course of decades, with advice from leading experts. They link the length and breadth of Gaza, and also connect it to the Sinai Peninsula under the city of Rafah.”
Hamas fighters emerge from tunnel openings to plant bombs and launch anti-tank missiles at armored vehicles, and then they disappear back into the tunnels: “And the IDF currently has no quick solutions for the fight.”
Brik says that IDF officers have admitted that it will be very hard, if not impossible, to prevent Hamas from rebuilding itself, even after all the destruction the IDF has wreaked on its bases. The effort will require Israel to maintain large forces in Gaza for many years to come.
Ideal for Netanyahu if not for Israel — but Netanyahu does not put Israel first.
The act of not putting a Cause first extends to Israel’s enemies, as well. The Lebanese are not keen to support the Hezbollah Palestinians, and Hezbollah itself is not ready for war. Most of the organization’s forces are young and inexperienced. Its budget has been reduced due to the U.S. sanctions on Iran, and it as not been able to find a top-flight commander-in-chief to replace Imad Mughniyeh, who was killed in Damascus in an Israeli-American operation in 2008.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah has said that if Israel launches a full-scale war, his organization will unleash its full force. In other words, he will not take the initiative in starting a war to help Hamas.
Iran does not control any of the operational groups directly, and Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said of the Hamas attack “this is the work of Palestinians themselves.”
Iran’s UN officers issued a statement emphasizing that if Israel “does not intend to attack Iran, its interests, and its citizens, Iran will not intervene in this conflict.”
Khamenei vehemently shuns war. He held back the militants from supporting the Afghans in the was against America. Iran has nothing to gain from an active war this time either, and in fact its continuing development of its nuclear program would probably be threatened by Israeli strokes against its labs and refineries.
Khamenei has instructed the heads of his security forces to show “strategic patience” and refrain from getting involved in a direct confrontation with the United States.
Given that Hezbollah’s primary role in the Iranian theocratic system is as a deterrent force against a potential Israeli attack on Iran, Iran would lose one of its most vital deterrents against Israel if Hezbollah sustained major damage. In this context, even if Hamas endures a severe setback, Iran is unlikely to trigger Hezbollah to initiate a war with Israel.
Iran cannot rally its society for this fight in the same way it used to do in the war against Iraq. Social discontent has risen. There is also a moderate faction in the Iranian government that is warning against a war with America. And neither Hamas nor even Hezbollah is Iran’s proxy; it would be more accurate to think of them as Iran’s nonstate allies. There is no top-down relationship between Tehran and Hamas. Even as Hamas aligns its actions with Iran, its approaches could diverge, as they notably did during the Syrian civil war when Hamas supported the Sunni anti-Assad rebels.
Hezbollah may yet stumble into a war or have one dropped on it by Israel, but it would not be the initiator.
Hamas is on its own.
Enter the Houthis. They are an outsized pain-point, who get their leverage from their unique position.
If you want to ship goods from India and Asia to Europe or the Atlantic, or vice versa, you have two main options: You can sail through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, which is the fastest and most direct route, or you can sail all the way around the continent of Africa. About one-third of all the cargo traffic in the world takes the Red Sea route, which cuts the travel distance down by 6,000 miles and two weeks’ time.
The Houthis originated as a branch of Shia Islam, a fundamentalist form of Islam observed by Iran’s Khomeini government. The neighboring state of Saudi Arabia practices the Sunni form of Islam, so tensions were set to be high. A war broke out which was settled, ironically, with American negotiation.
The Houthis are now Iran’s chosen proxies because from their base in Yemen they are close to the Red Sea’s strategic waterways and yet far enough from Israel to make retaliatory strikes difficult.
Likewise, they have no missiles capable of hitting Israel.
Houthi assaults on Israeli-linked ships would improve the group’s standing in the Arab world and would give them local support from Yemen.
All that said, although the Houthis are outspoken supporters of Hamas, Iran once again takes a back seat to Houthi ambitions. No doubt it wishes they would just go away.
But a regional campaign to suppress the Houthis would be a nightmare. I’ve climbed those cliffs and walked that desert; it is not a good place for a campaign. It makes Vietnam look easy. And those people are among the world’s poorest and most desperate peoples; bombing them would be a horrific act with no moral excuse. If you offered them food and medical care, you would have their support.
Thus far a group of countries led by the United States has warned the Houthis of “consequences” unless they stop their attacks on Red Sea shipping vessels. The United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Germany, Bahrain and Japan are among the 12 signatories. The US has sent an aircraft carrier, the USS Dwight D Eisenhower, to the area.
“Let our message now be clear: we call for the immediate end of these illegal attacks and release of unlawfully detained vessels and crews,” said the White House statement.
The current situation regarding regional players is thus: no one wants an expanded regional war except the Houthis, who are too far away to matter, and their boats can be contained. Iran wants to avoid war, Hezbollah is in no condition to fight one, and none of the surrounding Arab states has indicated any eagerness to help Hamas.
Netanyahu, however, could actually trigger an expanded war, could politically benefit from one, and is unconstrained by the US.
The cost of the war in Gaza has already reached $20.5 billion, and could double as the year goes on. America covers those costs, so that will not stop him.
If the war pauses long enough for tempers to get under control and to have Netanyahu ejected, the Hamas leadership would no doubt be eager to come to terms and stop the killing. Even if the IDF are not winning, neither are the people of Gaza.
Fundamentally, there is no underlying violence in the religions facing each other in the region; there is no endemic reason for this war.
I am not an expert but from what I know of Judaism, it seems to be a religion based on order and centred around the family unit. Treat people fairly. Be kind to strangers. Sadly, the current leadership seems to have made Israel the most dangerous place to be Jewish…
I have been in the desert in Saudi Arabia and have sat on the rugs on the sand under the night sky, and have been treated to meals by strangers and had really good coffee from soft-spoken people. They have no visceral hatred of Israel.
This really could be a Holy Land.
And the people there know it. But a few of the leaders need ‘correction’.
I trust that the Israelis will at some point be able to constrain their rogue, and that Hamas will do the same.
The Iranians are not the villains they are made out to be. I confess I have never been there, but it’s on my List.
This Could end well. On many occasions — as with Rabin and Arafat — it almost Did end well.
Netanyahu only become Prime Minister by half-a-percent of the vote.
The world came that close to peace.

There would have been no Hamas, no violent Hezbollah, and maybe even a situation where Iran lends money to Jerusalem to rebuild the temples.
This is not a pre-ordained condition — it is a mad mistake.
It can be nudged back on-track. I propose a new initiative: the Restoration of Arab Bi-State Israeli Neutrality (RABIN).
Other acronyms welcome!
Peace is possible…under difference leadership.
Written by Barry Gander
A Canadian from Connecticut: 2 strikes against me! I'm a top writer, looking for the Meaning under the headlines. Follow me on Mastodon @Barry
Not only does Hamas not have any Arab allies, Gaza refugees are not welcomed by anyone in the region. Both the PLO and Hamas have a long history of terrorism and no sane country wants to import that misery within their boundaries.
https://medium.com/the-geopolitical-economist/the-3-times-palestinians-were-kicked-out-of-other-arab-countries-76aa91454f66